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53 CBLJ 416 - DEBT OR EQUITY? A PUZZLE FOR CANADIAN
BANKRUPTCY LAW
1. Introduction
The Modiglani-Miller theorem or the "capital structure irrelevance" principle (the "MM
Theorem") suggests that, in an efficient market, it does not matter if the firm's capital is raised by
issuing stock or selling debt. 1 Essentially, the MM Theorem suggests that firms should focus on
the net present values of each investment rather than the composition of their capital. 2 The MM
Theorem acknowledges that capital structure is only irrelevant under a certain market price
process which includes the absence of bankruptcy costs. 3 However, when the relevance of
bankruptcy costs is taken into account, the capital structure of the firm also becomes relevant.
Firms that are highly leveraged by debt theoretically have an increased chance of experiencing
financial distress which can lead to the expenditure of hefty bankruptcy costs, decreasing firm
value. 4 Determining the nature of a firm's capital structure is significant in assessing bankruptcy
costs and structuring transactions. However, this is not a simple exercise in many instances. To
this end, recent reforms to Canadian bankruptcy legislation sought to clarify the distinction
between debt and equity for the purposes of bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings.
With the increased sophistication of financial markets and financial instruments, the use of
hybrid investments has been on the rise in recent decades. 5 This development supports the need
for the "equity claim" amendment --- an attempt to codify the definition and treatment of debt
and equity under Canadian bankruptcy legislation. These hybrid investments combine elements
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of both debt and equity. Prominent examples of hybrid investments include redeemable preferred
shares, convertible debentures, debentures which have their interest rate tied to the performance
of one or more equities, income securities, and debentures with attached warrants, among many
other variations. From the perspective of the issuers, hybrid securities appear to have grown in
popularity because they allow issuers to achieve a lower cost of capital than would otherwise be
achievable under separate issues of debt and equity. 6 From the perspective of the investor,
hybrid securities have presumably grown in popularity because they allow investors to
experience the benefits of both debt and equity, combined within one financial instrument.
Because hybrid instruments contain debt and equity characteristics of varying magnitude, it is
difficult to pigeonhole them into debt or equity categories. 7 However, the classification of an
instrument as debt or equity is crucial in the context of bankruptcy; the classification determines
whether investors will be ranked along with creditors in bankruptcy proceedings or whether they
will be subordinated to the creditors, unlikely to receive a distribution in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Despite various policy arguments in disagreement with the concept of blanket
subordination of equity, the equity amendment codifies the subordination of equity claims in a
manner that is even more strict than other jurisdictions such as the United States; 8 the
amendment and corresponding jurisprudence appear to make clear that equity will be
subordinated to debt without exception.
This article considers the question of how Canadian courts have drawn the border between
debt and equity in the context of bankruptcy proceedings. The basic argument is that Canadian

courts should allow the recent reforms to bring about their intended clarity on the border between
debt and equity by not
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departing from the bright line test set out in the legislation. Following this Introduction, Part 2
provides an overview and a rationale for the recent amendments to Canadian bankruptcy
legislation that have codified the distinction between debt and equity. Part 3 considers how
Canadian courts treated the distinction before the reforms and compares this case law to the
treatment following the reforms. Part 4 provides two case studies to illustrate why the postamendment approach without further judicial intervention is superior to both the pre-amendment
and post-amendment approach taken by the courts. Part 5 concludes.
2. Defining Debt and Equity under the BIA and the CCAA
In September, 2009, two specific amendments to the Companies' Credits Arrangement
Act 9 (CCAA) and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 10 (BIA) came into effect. The first
amendment codified the common law doctrine of blanket subordination. 11 For example, s. 6(8)
of the CCAA states that: 12
No compromise or arrangement that provides for the payment of an equity claim is to be sanctioned by
the court unless it provides that all claims that are not equity claims are to be paid in full before the equity
claim is to be paid.

This specific amendment was not particularly contentious; it codified a common law rule of
blanket subordination which subordinates the interests of shareholders until after all of the
company's creditors had been paid in full. 13
At the point of insolvency, the relationship between shareholders and creditors can be
described as a zero sum game; if the shareholders recouped their capital investment, the returns
of the creditors would be diminished and, if the company's assets are divided amongst the
creditors, the shareholders' investments will
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be lost. 14 The common law rule of blanket subordination was developed to address these
competing interests and to determine in what order the claims would be ranked. Creditors are
ranked ahead of shareholders because of the risk of participation associated with each type of
investment.
In the simplest formulation, equity holders assume the risk that the value of their investment is
contingent on the performance of the company and because they also possess some rights of
control ( i.e. , voting rights) to define the risk of the company. Creditors, on the other hand, do
not assume that their return is contingent on the performance of the company nor do they possess
the positive control powers held by shareholders. 15 Because equity holders have taken on this
increased risk participation and have assumed the higher risk associated with their investments,
they are ranked below the creditors in insolvency proceedings because the creditors have not
assumed such risks. However, in order for this analysis to apply, the line between equity and
debt needs to be clearly drawn.

The second component of the equity amendment added the definition of an "equity claim" to s.
2 of each of the CCAA and the BIA --- a definition that did not previously appear in either
statute. This definition states that an equity claim is: 16
[A] claim that is in respect of an equity interest, including a claim for, among others, (a) a dividend or
similar payment, (b) a return of capital, (c) a redemption or retraction obligation, (d) a monetary loss
resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest or from the rescission, or, in Quebec,
the annulment, of a purchase or sale of an equity interest, or (e) contribution or indemnity in respect of a
claim referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d).

According to the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, this amendment was
adopted to "provide greater clarity in subsequent provisions that deal with the rights of
shareholders." 17 However, despite this intent to create clarity, the courts have appeared to
grapple with the judicial role in the classification process, a role which was previously purely
discretionary and now involves applying specific definitions.
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3. Judicial Application of the Debt/Equity Distinction
Prior to the amendments to the CCAA and the BIA, the courts had no statutory guidance as to
the definition of an equity claim. Therefore, Canadian courts adopted a contextual, intentionbased approach to determine if a hybrid investment constituted debt or equity.
In the leading Canadian decision on the debt/equity distinction, Canada Deposit Insurance
Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank ( CDIC v. CCB ), 18 a 1992 decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada, the court considered the characterization of emergency financial assistance provided
to the CCB by a group of lending institutions and the federal government (the "Participants").
The arrangement provided, inter alia , that the Participants would receive, in return for their
financial contribution, warrants to buy up to 75% of CCB's common shares. Iacobucci J.,
delivering the court's judgment, stated that, in the case of hybrid investments, the court should
characterize the investment based on its substance. He stated: "When a court is searching for
the substance of a particular transaction [italics added], it should not be too easily distracted by
aspects which are, in reality, only incidental or secondary in nature to the main thrust of the
agreement." 19 In his view, in the case of the emergency financial assistance provided by the
Participants, although equity features existed in the transaction, the transaction constituted debt
in substance. Essentially, the court indicated that the characterization should focus on the
significant aspects of the investment which work to shape its characterization, rather than those
features which are merely incidental and have little effect on the substance of the transaction.
Laying the groundwork for the approach to characterization that should be taken by the courts,
Iacobucci J. stated: 20
As in any case involving contractual interpretation, the characterization issue facing this court must be
decided by determining the intention of the parties to the support agreements [italics added]. This task,
perplexing as it sometimes proves to be, depends primarily on the meaning of the words chosen by the
parties to reflect their intention. When the words alone are insufficient to reach a conclusion as to the true
nature of the agreement, or when outside support for a particular characterization is required a
consideration of admissible surrounding circumstances may be appropriate.
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Iacobucci J. found that the words and express terms chosen by the parties in their agreements
strongly supported the conclusion that the transaction constituted, and was intended to be, a loan
rather than a capital investment. 21 In addition, although the words and express terms chosen by
the parties were sufficient to classify the investment, he also noted that it was highly unlikely
that the warrants would be exercised by the Participants and he treated this as a surrounding
circumstance, among others, that supported the finding that the financial assistance represented a
loan. 22 The combination of the substance of the transaction and the intention of the parties
culminated in a finding that the transaction represented a loan, rather than a capital investment,
and therefore should be ranked above equity claims in the insolvency proceedings.
In Central Capital Corp., Re , 23 a 1996 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, the court
applied the groundwork laid down in CDIC v. CCB . The Court of Appeal considered the
characterization of an investment of preferred shares with a retraction clause, entitling the holder
to retract each preferred share on a fixed date at a fixed price (no dividends were declared on
these shares). The company became insolvent prior to the retraction date and was unable to
redeem any shares as it would be contrary to applicable law.
In considering the parties' intention, writing for the court, Laskin J.A. examined the share
purchase agreements, conditions attached to the shares, articles of incorporation, and the
treatment of the shares in the financial statements to analyse the intentions of the
parties. 24 Although these primary considerations supported a finding that the preferred shares
represented equity, not debt, the court also considered secondary factors that encompassed the
surrounding circumstances to support the initial finding. In addition, Laskin J.A. confirmed that
retraction rights did not represent debt claims because "the right of retraction provides for the
return of capital not for the repayment of a loan." 25
In a subsequent decision, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice was called upon to revisit the
same issue, reaching a different conclusion. In I. Waxman & Sons Ltd., Re , 26 Pepall J.
confirmed
Page 422
that claims for declared dividends represent debt claims and suggested that there is support for
the proposition that an equity claim can change into a debt claim over time. 27 Again, with no
definition to guide the court's analysis, this characterization of declared but unpaid dividends was
at the discretion of the court --- influenced by the common law conceptions of debt and equity.
In September, 2009, the amendments to the BIA and the CCAA came into effect. The
definition of an "equity claim" and the codification of blanket subordination provisions became
operational parts of the CCAA and the BIA. The expectation was that with a clear definition in
place to guide the courts and parties, greater clarity would be achieved. 28 However, this did not
occur. Instead of substituting the intention-based, contextual analysis with an analysis purely of
whether the claim fit into the definition of an "equity claim," the courts added the definitionbased analysis to the existing test.
In Nelson Financial Group Ltd., Re , 29 a post-amendment decision of the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice, Pepall J. once again considered the characterization of a claim for declared but
unpaid dividends. Pepall J. determined that this claim fell within the ambit of the definition of an
"equity claim" in s. 2 of the CCAA because it represented a claim for "declared but unpaid

dividends" 30 and, ultimately, the claim was classified as equity rather than debt, a decision that
varied from her previous finding in Waxman . However, prior to making this finding, she
conducted a complete contextual analysis of the situation by applying the analysis laid down
in CDIC v. CCB . Pepall J. considered matters such as the fact that the investors chose to invest
in shares despite the option to invest in promissory notes, the fact that they had the right to
receive dividends, a condition on the shares that they be ranked ahead of common shareholders
(therefore implying that they ranked below credit-holders), and the fact that the shares were
treated as equity in Nelson's financial statements. 31
Ultimately, Pepall J. reached a conclusion that was consistent with the new amendment. Her
decision appears to have been based
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on a finding that the claim fell within the ambit of the new "equity claim" definition, and this
result varied from her previous decision in Waxman because of this new analysis. However, the
contextual, intention-based analysis provided in the later judgment blurred and distorted the
actual analysis that is required for these types of claims, rather than increasing the clarity of the
analysis as was presumably intended by the amendment. It can be assumed that the intention of
the amendment was to make it simpler for all parties involved to easily determine which
category, debt or equity, their claim fell within and to eliminate the court's discretionary role in
the classification of investments, thereby increasing certainty.
If courts continue to assume this discretionary role in applying the 2009 amendments, the goal
of increased clarity and predictability will not be achieved. For example, in Nelson Financial
Group Ltd., Re , Pepall J. did not explain why she departed from the pre-amendment case law.
Pepall J. included declared but unpaid dividends in her list of claims that are now "equity claims"
in contrast to the pre-amendment case law, which treated them as debt. She does not provide an
analysis or explain why such a claim is different from a similar claim that has been reduced to a
judgment prior to filing. Accordingly, Nelson Financial Group Ltd. does not appear to adopt the
bright line test introduced by the 2008-2009 amendments and does not provide clarity on when
or why the strict definition of "equity claim" should be departed from.
4. Case Studies on the Debt/Equity Distinction
The following two case studies illustrate the difficulties, uncertainty, and lack of clarity that
result from the current judicial treatment of the debt/equity classification in bankruptcy
proceedings for hybrid investments. For each case study, an analysis is provided of the way in
which a Canadian court would have treated the situation pre-amendment and the way in which
the situation should be analyzed post-amendment.
(a) Goyte
Goyte's authorized capital consists of common shares and preferred shares. The preferred
shares have cumulative dividend terms and are redeemable at the option of the shareholder at any
time after August 3, 2014. Upon redemption, holders of the
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preferred shares are owed the par value plus all accrued and unpaid dividends.

According to Goyte's articles of incorporation, the dividends will be paid "to the extent
permitted under the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA)." The articles also provide that
"dividends shall accrue whether or not they have been declared and whether or not there are
profits, surplus or other funds of the corporation legally available for the payment of the
dividends." In addition, the liquidity provisions in the articles provide for priority of the
preferred shares' dividends and redemptions ahead of junior securities.
Goyte's preferred shareholders have exercised their redemption right. However, Goyte does
not have sufficient funds to pay these shareholders and/or is prohibited from doing so due to the
provisions of the CBCA. Goyte has also entered bankruptcy proceedings. The issue at hand is
whether the preferred shareholders have an equity claim, subordinating them to Goyte's
creditors, or a debt claim.
Pre-amendment Canadian courts would have taken a contextual approach in determining
whether the Goyte preferred shares represent debt or equity in the context of bankruptcy
proceedings. Applying Iacobucci J.'s analysis, the court would first need to analyze the intention
of the parties, specifically derived from their agreements (in this case, the articles of
incorporation and the stock purchase agreements). The court could look to any of the following
considerations in determining the parties' intention:
• Goyte is obliged to set apart funds for payment of cumulative dividends that it are not able to
pay;
• There is a provision for an increasing dividend rate if Goyte fails to make a redemption when
due (this is similar to a provision for the payment of interest after the redemption date); and
• The articles suggest that the dividends that accrued but that are unpaid due to s. 42 of the
CBCA may be considered a debt.
The following considerations indicate an "equity" intention:
• The articles do not provide that, after the redemption date and in the event of insolvency, the
preferred shareholders would have the right to have Goyte wound up;
•
The articles do not provide that on insolvency the preferred shareholders rank pari
passu with Goyte's creditors;
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•

The preferred shares are part of the authorized capital of Goyte;

• The preferred shareholders have the right to receive dividends on their shares and to vote
(both well-recognized rights of shareholders), in addition to the requirement of written consent
on a wide range of matters relating to Goyte's governance and financial affairs if there are
preferred shares outstanding that are convertible into at least 14% of the common shares of
Goyte; and
•
The articles do not state that the preferred shareholders cease to be shareholders upon
providing a redemption notice.

Pre-amendment, the court would have to balance all of these considerations in determining the
parties' true intention. In addition, as outlined in CDIC v. CCB , the substance of the transaction
must also be considered. The court would have to determine whether the transaction should be
classified, in substance, as debt or equity, ignoring the incidental aspects of the preferred shares
that might indicate otherwise.
Taken together, the above considerations, derived from the stock purchase agreements, the
articles of incorporation, and the conditions attached to the preferred shares, likely indicate that,
in substance, the preferred shareholders are shareholders, not creditors of Goyte. When we look
at the analysis in practice, we can see the practical problems associated with the contextual
approach. With the use of the contextual approach, there is no certainty for any of the parties at
any point in the investment, from the time of the transaction until the time of insolvency.
Because the court's analysis was focused on the parties' intention, the substance of the
agreement, and any surrounding circumstances, all of which could change over time, the
relationship between the company and investor and the classification of the investment could
also change over time. However, the benefit of the "equity claim" amendment is that it provides
certainty at the time of the transaction and does not allow for the classification to change over
time.
In a post-amendment analysis, the result of the classification would presumably be the same.
However, the difference is the increased clarity and certainty that is derived from this simplified
analysis. If the analysis were conducted in the way proposed in this article, it would consist
purely of an application of the definition of an "equity claim" to these facts to determine if the
preferred shares and their associated redemption clause fell within the definition.
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Section 2 of the CCAA and the BIA state that an "equity claim means a claim that is in respect of
an equity interest, including a claim for, among others, . . . (c) a redemption or retraction
obligation." 32 It is evident that the claim of the preferred shareholders fits squarely within this
definition; the preferred shareholders are making a claim for the redemption value of their
shares, a claim that is clearly classified as an equity claim in the definition. No other analysis is
required to classify the investment in a way that is consistent with the amendments. With this
simple analysis, there is greater clarity and certainty about the way the investment will be
categorized at any point in time. At the time when the preferred shares are issued, for example,
Goyte's creditors can know, with certainty, that the preferred shareholders will remain equity
claimants upon insolvency even if their redemption right was exercised because an analysis of
the intention of the parties and surrounding circumstances, which cannot be projected into the
future, is not part of the classification decision. Greater predictability is achieved by essentially
removing the court's discretion to classify the investment.
Although the post-amendment courts have appeared to base their classification decisions
primarily on the "equity claim" definition rather than the contextual analysis and have reached
decisions that are consistent with the equity amendment, the problem with this approach is that
the contextual analysis is still conducted in the first place. This results in an unnecessary lack of
clarity. When the court's discretion remains part of the analysis, however inconsequential it may
be to the overall analysis, it gives the illusion that the contextual analysis is a significant aspect
of the overall classification decision.

Let us now turn to a second case study to illustrate how an otherwise simple analysis appears
complicated by the addition of a step which ultimately has, or should have, no bearing on the
outcome of the classification.
(b) Wuthering Heights
A special purpose trust was created to hold an agricultural property (the "Trust"). Convertible
secured debentures (the "Debentures") were issued in relation to the Trust and would be held by
a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) formed by Wuthering LLC and Heights LLC (both
American). At the option
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of the holder, the Debentures were convertible into 99% of the units of the Trust at any time after
the earliest of the following events:
•

A change in law allowing for foreign ownership of the Trust;

• If the foreign ownership restrictions applicable to the agricultural property no longer apply
(for example, because of a sale of the agricultural property by the Trust); or
•

If the Debentures are held by a Canadian citizen.

It is important to note that the likelihood of any of these four conditions occurring was very low.
The Debentures had a 9% coupon, payable quarterly. If the Trust had insufficient cash flow to
pay the interest, it was entitled to defer the interest for up to two years after the year in which the
interest accrued, at which time the issuer would pay the interest in-kind by issuing additional
debentures. The Debentures had a maturity date of 39 years. In addition, the Debentures had
negative covenants which gave the holder approval rights over such matters as the holder may
determine, as necessary or appropriate, to protect or preserve its interests. Lastly, the Debentures
were ranked as senior secured indebtedness of the Trust.
The Trust became insolvent and the Debentures need to be classified as debt or equity for the
purposes of ranking them for bankruptcy proceedings. Creditors of the Trust would like these
convertible debentures to be classified as equity (hence increasing the creditors' own distribution
in the bankruptcy proceedings) whereas the debenture holders would like the Debentures to be
classified as debt, thereby increasing the likelihood of recouping their investment. For the
purposes of this example, the holders have not exercised their right to convert the Debentures to
units of the Trust.
Once again, a pre-amendment court would take a contextual approach to the classification of
this investment, looking primarily at the intention of the parties in addition to surrounding
circumstances. In this case, the court would look to any of the following considerations in
determining the parties' intentions:
The following considerations indicate a "debt" intention:
• The likelihood of any of the conditions for conversion occurring was very low, indicating an
intention to avoid conversion to units of the Trust;
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• The Debentures were ranked as senior secured indebtedness of the trust, implying that the
Debentures would rank above equity in the event of insolvency; and
•

The Debentures paid a quarterly coupon.

The following considerations indicate an "equity" intention:
• The Debentures had negative covenants, which gave the holder approval rights over matters
affecting the Trust (arguably similar to shareholder voting rights); and
•
The Debentures were convertible to units of the trust, however unlikely conversion was
likely to occur.
As mentioned in the Goyte case study, the court would have to balance all of the above
considerations to determine the true intentions of the Debenture holders and the Trust while also
keeping in mind the true substance of the transaction and ignoring the incidental aspects of the
investment. Based on the above considerations, it is likely the court would classify the
Debentures as an investment that is, in substance, a debt. The court is likely to view the
unlikelihood of the occurrence of the conditions for conversion as a major indicator that the
parties intended to form a debtor-creditor relationship. However, this prediction, based on the
contextual approach, is by no means certain without the guidance of the "equity claim"
definition.
In the post-amendment approach to the debt-equity distinction, there would be a much greater
amount of certainty. Recall the definition of an "equity claim": it is "a claim that is in respect of
an equity interest." 33 When we look at the definition of an "equity interest" in the context of a
trust, it is "a unit in the income trust --- or a warrant or option or another right to acquire a unit in
the income trust --- other than one that is derived from a convertible debt." 34 An exception for
convertible debt, as exists in this case study, has clearly been carved out in the formulation of
this definition. Since it is evident that the Debentures do not fit into the definition of an equity
interest, an equity claim clearly cannot be present.
Although this simplified approach leads to the same conclusion as the court likely would have
rendered after a contextual analysis, the major difference between the two approaches is that the
Page 429
definition-based analysis is certain, simplified, and practical. It is clear and obvious that the
assumed facts do not fit the definition of an "equity interest" and an "equity claim" and will not
constitute an equity claim at any point in time, despite any circumstances that may arise or
intentions to the contrary. Given the statutory approach, the decision is not clouded by the
unnecessary contextual analysis supplied by the court, and the reasoning leading to the decision
is plain and clear as intended by the drafters of the amendments.
5. Conclusion
Prior to the "equity claim" amendment, Canadian courts used a contextual approach to classify
investments, focusing on the intention of the parties. However, with the introduction of the
"equity claim" amendment, confusion looms about the nature of the court's role in the

classification decision. Canadian courts have continued to provide a contextual analysis despite
there being no need to do so when an analysis based solely on the definition of an "equity claim"
is sufficient. This article has compared the pre- and post-amendment case law and used two case
studies to illustrate the undue complexity that has been created by layering a contextual analysis
on top of the new bright line tests introduced by the 2009 amendments. Simply put, in the
context of investment classification decisions for the purposes of bankruptcy proceedings,
Canadian courts should limit the scope of their analysis to an inquiry of whether the investment
in question falls within the scope of the "equity claim" definition provided in s. 2 of the CCAA
and the BIA. Only then can bankruptcy costs be limited and can we come closer to the model
assumed by the MM Theorem.
Stephanie Ben-Ishai *
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